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Rethinking Federal Judicial Selection 
Carl Tobias* 
The inauguration of President Bill Clinton, who will 
appoint more than three hundred new federal judges, affords 
an auspicious occasion for rethinking the process of federal 
judicial selection. Appointing federal judges is one of the 
President's most significant responsibilities, because Article III 
judges enjoy life tenure and resolve disputes that implicate 
Americans' fundamental freedoms. The selection process, 
especially for choosing Supreme Court Justices, has become 
increasingly contentious and decreasingly substantive. High 
Court nominees have included "stealth" candidates and judges 
who have carefully recited a standard litany, regarding issues 
such as the right of privacy, which they believed the Senate 
Judiciary Committee wanted to hear. The confirmation 
proceedings of Justice Clarence Thomas were symptomatic and 
even plumbed new depths. Senate hearings for nearly all 
circuit and district court nominees have correspondingly lacked 
substance, although their ostensible purpose is to scrutinize the 
candidates' fitness for judicial service. 
The current federal bench, two-thirds of whose members 
were appointed by Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush, 
reflects increased conservatism and is quite homogeneous in 
terms of race, gender, and political perspectives. For instance, 
President Reagan appointed a dramatically smaller, and 
President Bush named a substantially lower, percentage of 
African-Americans than did President Jimmy Carter. The 
Republican chief executives made these appointments although 
they had much larger, more experienced, pools of female and 
minority attorneys from which to select judges. 
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Mark 
Gitenstein, Melissa Harrison, Rob Natelson, Peggy Sanner and Tammy Wyatt-Shaw 
for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing 
this piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that 
remain are mine. 
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The substantive decisionmaking of many Republican 
appointees also manifests conservatism. For example, the 
judges have restrictively interpreted the Constitution and 
congressional legislation, have limited federal court access, and 
have narrowly viewed the rights of individuals accused of 
crime. The Republican Presidents, accordingly, achieved their 
expressly stated objective of creating a more conservative 
judiciary, even though they arguably exceeded popular 
consensus in appointing judges. The factors above have 
apparently increased public cynicism about judicial selection 
and may have eroded respect for the federal courts. 
All of these considerations, particularly the advent of a 
new administration and growing disillusionment with the 
process of choosing judges, make the present a propitious time 
to reconsider selection. 'I'his Article undertakes that effort. The 
.Article first examines how Presidents Carter, Reagan and Bush 
named judges. It assesses the goals articulated, the procedures 
employed, the judges confirmed, and the decisional records of 
those appointed. Because this evaluation finds that the 
processes for choosing judges were problematic, it concludes 
with suggestions for improving federal judicial selection. 
I. THE RECENT HISTORY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION 
The judicial selection policies enunciated, the procedures 
followed, the judges named, and their decisionmaking during 
the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations warrant 
considerable treatment here, although other observers have 
explored these phenomena.1 Numerous aspects of this history 
are important to understanding recent developments involving 
judicial selection and the recommendations presented in Part II 
of the Article; those features will be emphasized in this Part. 
1. See, e.g., Charles M. Mathias, Jr., Advice and Consent: The Role of the 
United States Senate in the JrMiicial Selection Process, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 200 
(1987); David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the 
Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1502-12 (1992); Carl Tobias, The Gender 
Gap on the Federal Bench, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171, 172-76 (1990); cf. W. Gary 
Fowler, A Comparison of Initial Recommendation Procedures: Judicial Selection 
Under Reagan and Carter, 1 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 299, 301-06 (1983) (pre-1975 
history); Strauss & Sunstein, supra, at 1494-1502 (same). See generally MARK H. 
GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE (1992); DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE 
(1988). 
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A. The Carter Administration 
President Carter had a clear, strong commitment to im-
proving the federal judiciary, which he pursued in a number of 
ways.2 The President believed that reduced reliance on tradi-
tional procedures, such as patronage and senatorial courtesy, 
the concomitant opening of the selection process to broader 
public participation, and the creation of a larger, more diverse 
pool of potential candidates would foster the appointment of 
better judges.3 Nominating commissions were instrumentali-
ties integral to these phenomena, and the Carter administra-
tion employed the panels for both appellate and district 
courts.4 
An important dimension of President Carter's judicial se-
lection policy was his determination to place substantially 
increased numbers of women and minorities on the federal 
bench. 5 When the Carter administration assumed office, there 
were only two African-Americans and one woman among the 
ninety-seven appeals court judges and only twenty African-
Americans or Latinos and five women among the 400 district 
court judges.6 
President Carter created the United States Circuit Judge 
Nominating Commission to recommend lawyers for appoint-
ment to the federal appellate courts.7 The Carter administra-
2. I rely substantially in this subsection on Elliot E. Slotnick, Lowering the 
Bench or Raising It Higher?: Affirmatiue Action and Judicial Selection During the 
Carter Administration, 1 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 270 (1983), and on numerous arti-
cles in Judicature magazine, such as those in the issue titled Federal Judicial 
Selection: The Problems and Achievements of Carter's Merit Plan, 62 JUDICATURE 
463-510 (1979). 
3. See Fowler, supra note 1, at 307-09, 331; see also Slotnick, supra note 2, 
at 296-98; cf. O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 49-80 (discussing patronage and senatorial 
courtesy). 
4. See LARRY C. BERKSON & SUSAN B. CARBON, THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT 
JUDGE NOJ\fiNATING COMMISSION: !TS MEJ\ffiERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES 
(1980); ALAN NEFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NOJ\fiNATING COMMIS-
SIONS: THEIR MEJ\ffiERS, PROCEDURES, AND CANDIDATES (1981). 
5. See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 1, at 299-300, 307-09; Elliot E. Slotnick, 
Gender, Affirmative Action, and Recruitment to the Federal Bench, 14 GoLDEN GATE 
U. L. REV. 519, 530-35 (1984); Slotnick, supra note 2, at 271-77. 
6. See Robert J. Lipshutz & Douglas B. Huron, Achieving a More Represen-
tative Federal Judiciary, 62 JUDICATURE 483 (1979); see also Slotnick, supra note 2, 
at 271. See generally Elaine Martin, Women on the Federal Bench: A Comparatiue 
Profile, 65 JUDICATURE 306 (1982). 
7. See Lipshutz & Huron, supra note 6, at 484; Elaine Martin, Gender and 
Judicial Selection: A Comparison of the Reagan and Carter Administrations, 71 
JUDICATURE 136, 140 (1987). See generally BERKSON & CARBON, supra note 4. 
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tion established merit selection panels in each circuit to sug-
gest possible nominees when vacancies occurred, asking the 
panels to search for, find, recommend, and promote the candi-
dacies of highly-qualified female and minority attorneys. In 
May 1978, President Carter encouraged all of these panels "to 
make special efforts to seek out and identify well qualified 
women and members of minority groups as potential nomi-
nees."8 
With the 1978 passage of the Omnibus Judgeships Act 
creating 152 new judicial seats, the President intensified his 
efforts to make the ')udiciary more fully representative of our 
population"9 and requested that senators work with him to 
attain this goal. President Carter issued an Executive Order 
which asked that nominating commissions be created to sug-
gest district court nominees and which directed the Attorney 
General to ascertain whether the panels had affirmatively 
attempted to "identify qualified candidates, including women 
and members of minority groups" before forwarding names to 
the President.10 
Because President Carter was dissatisfied with the early 
results of these endeavors, he wrote the panels' chairs and 
senators requesting that they redouble their efforts to desig-
nate competent female and minority attorneys. 11 lliustrative 
of the Carter administration's approach to judicial selection 
was the Attorney Geneml's Senate testimony indicating that 
the President would appoint qualified women and minorities 
even when white male candidates who might be better quali-
fied were under consideration.12 
8. Exec. Order No. 12,059, 3 C.F.R. 180, 182 (1979), noted in 28 U.S.C. § 44 
(Supp. 1992), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,305, 3 C.F.R. 150 (1982), noted in 28 
U.S.C. § 44 (Supp. 1992). See generally Slotnick, supra note 5, at 530-31. 
9. President Jimmy Carter, Law Day Address (May 1, 1978), cited in 
Lipshutz & Huron, supra note 6, at 485; see also Omnibus Judgeships Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.). See generally O'BRIEN, mpra note 1, at 58-59. 
10. Exec. Order No. 12,0S7, 3 C.F.R. 254, 255 (1979), noted in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 133 (Supp. 1993), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,553, 3 C.F.R. 204, 210 (1987), 
noted in 28 U.S.C. § 133 (Supp. 1992). See generally NEFF, supra note 4. 
11. See Lipshutz & Huron, supra note 6, at 485; cf. Katherine Randall, The 
Success of Affirmative Action in the Sixth Circuit, 62 JUDICATURE 486 (1979) (panel 
member's description of how panel responded to President's requests); Peter G. 
Fish, Merit Selection and Politics: Choosing a Judge of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635 (1979) (panel 
member's description of how anc•ther panel functioned). 
12. The Selection and Confirmation of Federal Judges: Hearing Before the 
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The Carter administration apparently did not pursue very 
specific goals in terms of the political perspectives or judicial 
philosophies which nominees would have as federal judges, 
although it probably expected that the nominees would share 
the President's political viewpoints. 13 President Carter and 
those officials responsible for judicial selection could well have 
assumed that the administration's appointees, especially wom-
en and minorities, would generally be rather "liberal."14 
The Carter administration's efforts to name highly quali-
fied attorneys, including women and minorities, proved quite 
successful. Indeed, observers have characterized the nominat-
ing commissions as the most efficacious technique yet devel-
oped for increasing the number of female and minority lawyers 
appointed to the bench.15 The panels, composed of a broad 
spectrum of individuals, such as persons who had not partici-
pated in traditional politics, were able to identify, recommend, 
and champion the candidacies of highly competent attorneys 
with whom senators may have been less familiar.16 
Of the 258 judges whom President Carter ultimately ap-
pointed during his four-year tenure, there were forty women 
(15.5%) and thirty-seven African-Americans (14.3%).17 The 
administration's success in naming very qualified female and 
minority lawyers is striking because of the comparatively 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, pt. 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1979) [hereinafter 
Hearings) (statement of Griffin Bell); see also NEFF, supra note 4, at 102; cf. Elliot 
E. Slotnick, The Changing Role of the Senate Judiciary Committee in Judicial Se-
lection, 62 JUDICATURE 502, 503 (1979) (alluding to similar testimony). 
13. See O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 59-60; Fowler, supra note 1, at 308, 336; 
see also NEFF, supra note 4, at 149, 151. 
14. One definition of liberalism is a "relative tendency to vote in favor of the 
legal claims of the criminally accused and prisoners in criminal and prisoner's 
rights cases, and in favor of the legal claims of women and racial minorities in sex 
and race discrimination cases respectively." Jon Gottschall, Carter's Judicial Ap-
pointments: The Influence of Affirmative Action and Merit Selection on Voting on 
the U.S. Court of Appeals, 67 JUDICATURE 165, 168 (1983); see also infra notes 19-
20 and accompanying text. 
15. See Martin, supra note 7, at 140-41; see also Tobias, supra note 1, at 174. 
See generally BERKSON & CARBON, supra note 4; NEFF, supra note 4. But see infra 
notes 21-22, 131 and accompanying text. 
16. Cf. Sheldon Goldman, Should There Be Affirmative Action for the Judicia-
ry?, 62 JUDICATURE 488 (1979); Randall, supra note 11. See generally BERKSON & 
CARBON, supra note 4; NEFF, supra note 4. 
17. See Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle 
and Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318, 322, 325 (1989); see also Patricia M. Wald, 
Women in the Law, TRIAL, Nov. 1988, at 75. 
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small, relatively inexperienced, pool of attorneys from which to 
select.18 
It is more problematic to ascertain the quality of judicial 
service that the Carter appointees have provided. One impor-
tant reason for this is the difficulty of articulating parameters 
which accurately measure quality. Certain criteria have strong 
political connotations. For instance, the judges whom President 
Carter placed on the courts clearly have been more liberal than 
those appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush. 19 A some-
what less political example is that the Carter appointees have 
been comparatively sensitive to numerous constitutional rights 
of individuals; have sought out and implemented congressional 
intent in substantive statutes, even when it is not expressed 
with blinding clarity; and have afforded relatively expansive 
court access to resource-deficient parties, such as civil rights 
plaintiffs. 20 
More neutral parameters can pose problems of assessment. 
For instance, even if evaluators could clearly ascertain when 
judges resolved cases faster, it would be difficult to discern 
whether those dispositions were fairer, and even more difficult 
to draw conclusions about the judges' diligence from that deter-
mination. Greater complications attend efforts to measure oth-
er important judicial qualities. For example, it is virtually 
impossible to assess accurately the integrity, intelligence, inde-
pendence, and judicial temperament that specific judges have. 
The Carter administration's goals and procedures for se-
lecting federal judges, its appointees, and their decisionmaking 
have been rather controversial. For instance, conservative com-
mentators and politicians have been critical of the Carter selec-
tion process,21 and observers have characterized it as "affirma-
18. For example, there were 62,000 women in the legal profession in 1980 
and 140,000 female attorneys in 1988. Telephone Interview with Marena 
McPherson, American Bar Association Commission on Women in the Profession 
(Nov. 17, 1992); see also infra note 62 and accompanying text. See generally 
Slotnick, supra note 5, at 522-25. 
19. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying 
on a Tradition, 74 JUDICATURE 294, 306 (1991); Goldman, supra note 17, at 328; 
Neil A. Lewis, Selection of Conservative Judges Insures a President's Legacy, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 1992, at Al3; cf. Timothy B. Tomasi & Jess A. Velona, Note, All 
the President's Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REV. W6, 779-93 (1987) (finding Reagan appointees not 
significantly more conservative than Republican colleagues). 
20. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Carter's Judicial Appointments: A La.sting 
Legacy, 64 JUDICATURE 344, 355 (1981); see also Goldman, supra note 19, at 306; 
infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
21. For general discussions of the criticisms and citations to relevant primary 
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tive action" for the judiciary. They have implied that the ap-
pointees were less qualified,22 although the criticism seems to 
implicate disagreement with the judges' substantive determina-
tions. The decisionmaking of the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia specifically troubled many members of Con-
gress when Democratic appointees, including Carter judges, 
constituted a majority.23 Indeed, some senators and represen-
tatives introduced legislation which would have revamped 
traditional notions of venue by dramatically reducing the possi-
bilities for suing in Washington, D.C.24 
Despite these criticisms, many of President Carter's ap-
pointees apparently have been better qualified than judges 
named through more traditional procedures.25 A number of 
the female and minority judges, such as Circuit Judges Amalya 
Kearse, Patricia McGowan Wald, and Harry Edwards, have 
rendered exceptional judicial service. 26 One study correspond-
ingly found that women and minorities whom President Carter 
appointed had to satisfy higher standards for nomination than 
did other lawyers and that these female and minority judges 
were as qualified as their predecessors in terms of certain sig-
nificant parameters.27 There are also numerous reasons why 
sources, see O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 59; Slotnick, supra note 2, at 274-75; Elliot 
E. Slotnick, Reforms in Judicial Selection: Will They Affect the Senate's Role? Part 
II, 64 JUDICATURE 114, 117 (1980); see also BERKSON & CARBON, supra note 4, at 
183. 
22. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 12, pt. 8, at 2-5 (statement of Sen. Harry 
F. Byrd); see also Fowler, supra note 1, at 334; Slotnick, supra note 2, at 274-75. 
23. See Cass R. Sunstein, Participation, Public Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 976, 979, 999 (1982). See generally Venue Reform: Sue West, Young 
Man?, REGULATION, Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 10. 
24. See, e.g., H.R. 754, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 739, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1979). This legislation was dubbed "Sagebrush Venue," because its propo-
nents represented western states. Cf. PAUL LAXALT ET AL., VENUE AT THE CROSS-
ROADS (Steven R. Schlesinger ed., 1982) Oegislative analysis by proponents and 
opponents); Lewis, supra note 19 (discussing the much more conservative current 
composition of the District of Columbia Circuit); see also Sunstein, supra note 23. 
25. This is controversial and may ultimately depend on the definition of 
"qualified" employed. See Slotnick, supra note 2, at 298. 
26. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 19, at 306 (mentioning Judge Kearse as a 
possible Supreme Court nominee). Judge Edwards and Judge Wald have been ac-
tive participants in scholarly debate even while ably handling the highly complex 
cases resolved by the District of Columbia Circuit. See, e.g., Harry Edwards, The 
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. 
L. REV. 34 (1992); Patricia M. Wald, The "New Administrative Law"-With the 
Same Old Judges in It?, 1991 DUKE L.J. 647. 
27. See Slotnick, supra note 2, at 280-98; cf. Goldman, supra note 16, at 492-
93 (stating that female and minority Carter appointees on the whole "may even be 
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it is important to have the diverse perspectives, especially from 
personal life experiences, which many women and minorities 
bring to service on the federal bench. 28 
B. Republican Administrations 
The goals, procedures, and appointees of the Carter admin-
istration contrast markedly with those of President Reagan and 
President Bush. Moreover, both Republican administrations 
followed rather similar processes of judicial selection, relying 
on comparatively traditional policies and procedures. Because 
these practices have more limited relevance to the suggestions 
made in the next section of this Article, the selection processes 
of the Republican chief executives, and particularly those of 
President Bush, are accorded somewhat less treatment in this 
Article. 
1. The Reagan administration 
President Reagan swept into office in 1981 with what he 
claimed was a popular mandate to make the federal govern-
ment, including the judicial branch, more conservative.29 The 
Chief Executive specifically observed that his primary objective 
in choosing judges was to make the courts more conserva-
tive.30 President Reagan and his advisers sought out and pro-
posed nominees who they believed subscribed to the President's 
judicial philosophy.31 This meant, for example, that the nomi-
nees disagreed with the 'judicial activism" attributed to the 
Warren Court, which expansively interpreted the right of priva-
cy, the Equal Protection Clause, and the protections accorded 
the criminally accused. 32 President Reagan frequently spoke of 
more distinguished than ... white males chosen by Carter and previous adminis-
trations"). 
28. For example, these judges' presence on the bench makes the courts more 
representative of society. See also infra notes 101-104 and accompanying text. But 
see infra note 104. 
29. I rely substantially here on O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 60-64; Goldman, 
supra note 17. 
30. See, e.g., O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 60; Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Judi-
cial Appointments at Mid-term: Shaping the Bench in His Own Image, 66 JUDICA-
TURE 334, 347 (1983). 
31. See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 1, at 308; Goldman, supra note 17, at 319-
20. 
32. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy); Brown v. 
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (equal protection); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966) (protections accorded criminally accused); see also Goldman, supra 
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appointing attorneys who would exercise judicial restraint and 
be tough on crime.aa 
'l'hese selection policies partly reflected the broader conser-
vative agenda of the Reagan administration and the corre-
sponding view among a number of conservatives that the feder-
al courts were important institutions which had previously 
frustrated the attainment of certain conservative social and 
political aims, such as restricting abortion and fostering prayer 
in public schools.a4 President Reagan's goals concomitantly 
responded to the concern that passage of the Omnibus Judge-
ships Act had facilitated President Carter's appointment of 
numerous judges, too many of whom conservatives believed had 
overly liberal perspectives.as The Republican Chief Executive 
also found judicial appointments to be a relatively cost-free 
means of appeasing conservative elements in his political par-
ty. as 
The Reagan administration sought to achieve its objective 
of making the federal judicial bench more conservative in a 
number of ways. One approach was a negative response to the 
goals and procedures the Carter administration had employed. 
Among the initial actions President Reagan took upon assum-
ing office was the revocation of the executive orders governing 
selection that his predecessor had issued.a7 President Reagan 
correspondingly abolished Carter's Circuit Judge Nominating 
Commission and relied substantially less on the district court 
nominating panels.as The Reagan administration also under-
took virtually none of the special efforts President Carter had 
note 17, at 319-20. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPI'ING OF AMERICA 69-
100 (1990); ARCIIlBALD COX, THE WARREN COURI' (1968). 
33. See, e.g., O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 60; Fowler, supra note 1, at 336; cf. 
Sheldon Goldman, Reaganizing the Judiciary: The First Term Appointments, 68 
JUDICATURE 312, 328 (1985). 
34. See, e.g., Nadine Cohodas, Conservatives Pressing to Reshape Judiciary, 43 
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1759, 1759 (1985) (statement of Bruce Fein, former Associate 
Deputy Attorney General). See generally O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 61-62. 
35. See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 1, at 308; Goldman, supra note 30, at 337 
n.2; see also supra note 9. 
36. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Bush Picking the Kind of Judges Reagan Favored, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1990, at Al; Ruth Marcus, Bush Quietly Fosters Conservative 
Trend in Courts, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1991, at A4. See generally O'BRIEN, supra 
note 1, at 60-63. 
37. See supra notes 8, 10. 
38. See supra notes 8, 10; see also O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 61; Fowler, 
supra note 1, at 309-10. 
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instituted to search for, fmd, and appoint highly qualified wom-
en and minorities. 39 
President Reagan implicitly rejected other approaches 
implemented by the Carter administration.40 He applied selec-
tion procedures that were comparatively closed. President Rea-
gan involved relatively few participants in the process, while 
the pool of candidates considered, and the nominees actually 
appointed, were neither large nor diverse in terms of, for in-
stance, gender, race, or political views. The Chief Executive 
concomitantly relied on traditional procedures. Patronage and 
senatorial courtesy prominently figured in most judicial ap-
pointments. The Reagan administration deferred substantially 
to senators who represented geographic areas in which judicial 
vacancies occurred and rarely consulted the Senate Judiciary 
Committee before nominating candidates. 
President Reagan and individuals with responsibility for 
judicial selection also employed affirmative approaches to 
achieve the administration's goals. Those who recruited candi-
dates implemented President Reagan's policy directive to make 
the courts more conservative by diligently searching for lawyers 
with appropriate ideological viewpoints and forwarding their 
names to the President. 
The officials applied a number of techniques to effectuate 
this instruction, including several important innovations.41 
One innovation was placing substantial responsibility for selec-
tion in the Justice Department Office of Legal Policy. The Rea-
gan administration systematized screening procedures, even 
instituting the unprecedented practice of having Justice De-
partment employees extensively interview all serious candi-
dates in Washington. 42 
Administration personnel also consulted the substantive 
decisionmaking of federal circuit and district court judges in 
39. See Martin, supra note- 7, at 138-41; Slotnick, supra note 5, at 545-71; 
Tobias, supra note 1, at 174. Indeed, President Reagan named only three women 
out of eighty-seven judges during his first two years. See Goldman, supra note 17, 
at 325. 
40. I rely substantially in this paragraph on O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 60-64; 
Fowler, supra note 1, at 309-10; Goldman, supra note 17, at 319-20; see also Wil-
liam F. Smith, Attorney Generafs Memorandum on Judicial Selection Procedures 
(1981), reprinted in 64 JUDICATURE 428 (1981). 
41. I rely substantially in the next three paragraphs on O'BRIEN, supra note 
1, at 60-62; Fowler, supra note 1, at 309-10; Goldman, supra note 17, at 319-20. 
42. See, e.g., O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 60-62; Goldman, supra note 17, at 
319. 
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ascertaining their fitness for service on higher courts. 43 Some 
observers, accordingly, have accused President Reagan of con-
sidering ideological propriety, and even of relying on litmus 
tests respecting questions such as abortion, in deciding whether 
to elevate judges to the next tier in the federal court system. 44 
Professor Sheldon Goldman has observed that the Reagan 
administration arguably participated in the "most systematic 
judicial philosophical screening'' of candidates in the country's 
history,45 although he found "no evidence that judicial candi-
dates were asked how they would rule in any case" and con-
cluded that the administration did not apply litmus tests.46 
A second significant innovation was the President's Com-
mittee on Federal Judicial Selection.47 The counsel to the 
President chaired that entity, which included high-ranking 
officials in the White House and Justice Department.48 The 
committee had great symbolic and pragmatic importance. It 
symbolized the significance that President Reagan attached to 
control of the selection process as one means of naming judges 
who might enable the administration to realize its social agen-
da. 49 As a practical matter, the committee could analyze can-
didates and consider philosophical factors and political con-
cerns, such as their support from Republican senators. 50 
Another important aspect of President Reagan's approach 
to judicial selection was the relative lack of communication 
between his administration and the American Bar Association 
(ABA) Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary.51 Professor 
43. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 36; Tim Weiner, White House Builds Courts in 
Its Own Image, PmLA. INQUIRER, Oct. 7, 1990, at A-1. 
44. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 36; Weiner, supra note 43. President Reagan 
also emphasized prior judicial and prosecutorial experience in considering candi-
dates for district courts. See Martin, supra note 7, at 138-41; see also Goldman, 
supra note 17, at 319-20. 
45. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 319-20; see also O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 
60-62. 
46. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 320; see also Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's 
Second Term Judicial Appointments: The Battle at Midway, 70 JUDICATURE 324, 
326 (1987). 
47. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 320; see also Goldman, supra note 33, at 
315. See generally O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 61. 
48. See Fowler, supra note 1, at 310; Goldman, supra note 17, at 320; 
Goldman, supra note 33, at 315. 
49. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 320; see also Goldman, supra note 33, at 
315. 
50. See O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 61; Goldman, supra note 17, at 320. 
51. For discussion of the ABA Committee's role in evaluating nominees, see 
AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, THE ABA's STANDING COMMI'ITEE ON FEDERAL JUDI· 
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Goldman observed that no prior Republican administration had 
maintained such a distant relationship with the committee.s2 
He attributed this circumstance to Justice Department dissatis-
faction with the committee's system for evaluating nominees, a 
regime which often resulted in ratings less favorable than the 
administration desired. s3 
Republican Party control of the Senate during President 
Reagan's first six years in office facilitated the entire appoint-
ment process. s4 The Senate Judiciary Committee obviously 
had great incentives to approve nominees as rapidly as possible 
and to accommodate the administration. The confirmation 
proceedings consisted of rather perfunctory hearings in which a 
few senators asked nominees unenlightening questions. When 
the Democrats recaptured the Senate in the 1986 elections, the 
committee processed nominees with less alacrity and the hear-
ings became somewhat more substantive.ss 
President Reagan's attempt to place Judge Robert Bork on 
the Supreme Court aptly epitomized his administration's judi-
cial selection efforts. ss To solidify a conservative majority on 
the Court, the President nominated Judge Bork, who was wide-
ly regarded as holding very conservative views on numerous is-
sues of constitutional interpretation.s7 Most senators and 
much of the public believed that Judge Bork's perspectives 
CIARY: WHAT IT Is AND HOW IT WORKS (1991); O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 81-94; see 
also infra notes 82-87, 143-144 and accompanying text. 
52. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 320; see also O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 
61:. Goldman, supra note 33, at 316. 
53. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 320; see also O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 
61. Because the Carter administration maintained a non-controversial, relatively 
traditional relationship with the committee, that relationship was not discussed 
above. See generally id. at 58. 
54. For discussion of the Senate's role in the appointment process, see 
O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 65-80; Elliot E. Slotnick, The Changing Role of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee in Judicial Selection, 62 JUDICATURE 502 (1979). 
55. The difference was minimal-one of degree, not kind. Cf. Fish, supra note 
11 (describing rapid processing under Carter administration); Fowler, supra note 1, 
at 325-31 (describing similar roles of the Judiciary Committee in Carter and Rea-
gan Administrations); Roger J. Miner, Advice and Consent in Theory and Practice, 
41 AM. U. L. REV. 1075, 1081, 1085 (1992) (documenting how the process of nomi-
nation and advice and consent has recently "broken down for now and may not be 
functioning as the Framers intended" principally because Presidents and senators 
have ceded power to stafi). 
56. See GITENSTEIN, supra note 1; cf. BORK, supra note 32, at 271-349 (Judge 
Bo:rk's account of nomination proceedings). 
57. See GITENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 18-54, 76-137, 153-63. But see BORK, 
supra note 32, at 69-100, 139-221, 241-65. 
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were outside the mainstream of American legal thought, and 
the Senate soundly rejected his appointment after an acrimoni-
ous battle.58 
Despite this defeat, President Reagan ultimately accom-
plished his explicitly articulated goal. of making the courts 
more conservative, although he probably exceeded public con-
sensus. This increased conservatism is seen in the 368 judges 
whom President Reagan named.59 His appointees were very 
similar in terms of gender, race, and political viewpoint. Afri-
can-Americans constituted a mere 1.9% (7 out of 368) of the 
attorneys whom President Reagan placed on the courts during 
his two terms.so Women comprised only 7% (28 out of 368) of 
the judges named.st The tiny numbers and percentages of mi-
norities and women appointed become even more compelling in 
light of several salient facts. President Carter named seven 
times the percentage of African-Americans and double the 
percentage of women, even though he had a substantially 
smaller, less experienced pool of minority and female lawyers 
on which to draw.s2 
Conservatism can also be witnessed in the judicial determi-
nations of President Reagan's appointees. Many of those judg-
es, once in office, have resolved cases in a conservative manner. 
For example, they have narrowly interpreted the Constitution 
and congressional legislation, have curtailed federal court ac-
cess, and have sharply limited the rights of criminal defen-
dants. s3 The Supreme Court has persisted in restrictively 
reading much civil rights law, and Congress has responded by 
passing numerous civil rights restoration statutes.s4 These· 
developments culminated in the disastrous 1988 Term, in 
58. See GITENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 76-117, 153-63, 182-249, 267-96. But see 
Boru<, supra note 32, at 139-221, 241-343. 
59. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 322, 325. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
63. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 328-29; cf. Steve Alumbaugh & C.K 
Rowland, The Links Between Platform-Based Appointment Criteria and Trial 
Judges' Abortion Judgments, 74 JUDICATURE 153 (1990) (fmding Reagan appointees 
far more likely than Carter appointees to resist pro-abortion claims). See generally 
O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 60-64. 
64. See Roy L. Brooks, Beyond Civil Rights Restoration Legislation: Restruc-
turing Tiae VII, 34 ST. LouIS U. L.J. 551, 552-53 (1990) (recounting Court-Con-
gress point, counterpoint and enumerating restoration acts). See generally William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 
YALE L.J. 331 (1991). 
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which the Court narrowly applied numerous civil rights 
laws. 65 Congress reacted to those rulings by adopting the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.66 
2. The Bush administra.tion 
The Bush administration's approach to federal judicial 
selection warrants less treatment here, because it mirrored in 
many respects the process which the Reagan administration 
employed. For instance, President Bush expressly subscribed to 
the identical major purpose of creating a more conservative 
federal judiciary,67 considered judicial appointments a valu-
aTole means for cultivating conservative components of his polit-
ical coalition,68 and relied heavily on senatorial courtesy and 
patronage. 69 
The Bush administiration, however, dissimilarly treated 
some aspects of judicial selection. For example, President Bush 
assumed a different approach to the Supreme Court nomina-
tion process, a response the failed Bork nomination may have 
prompted. 70 The President submitted the names of stealth 
candidates, a strategy which proved successful with Justice 
David Souter. 
The administration apparently thought that similar tactics 
would lead to Judge Thomas' confirmation.71 His sparse judi-
65. See, e.g., Martin v. Willes, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. 
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). See generally Symposium, The United States Su-
preme Court's 1988 Term Civil Rights Cases, 64 TuL. L. REV. 1351 (1990). 
66. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 2 U.S.C.). See generally Carl 
Tobias, Civil Rights Procedural Problems, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 801 (1992). Measuring 
accurately the quality of appointees' judicial service is problematic. See supra notes 
19-20 and accompanying text. F•)r one assessment of the Reagan and Bush ap-
pointees, see infra notes 112-117 and accompanying text. 
67. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 36; Letter from President George Bush to 
Senator Robert Dole (Nov. 30, 1990) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Letter); 
see also supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text. 
68. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 19; Marcus, supra note 36; see also supra note 
36 and accompanying text. 
69. See, e.g., Gi>ldman, supra note 19, at 295-97; Lewis, supra note 36; see 
also supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
70. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
71. I rely substantially here on contemporaneous newspaper accounts. See 
generally TIMOTHY M. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNITZ, CAPITOL GAMES: CLARENCE 
THOMAS, ANITA HILL, AND THE STORY OF A SUPREME COURT NOMINATION (1992); 
PAUL SIMON, ADVICE AND CONSENT (1992); Symposium, Gender, Race and the Poli-
tics of Supreme Court Appointments: The Import of the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas 
Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1992) [hereinafter Symposium). 
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cial record contradicted President Bush's assertion that Judge 
Thomas was the best possible candidate for the Court.72 Nu-
merous observers criticized the President for nominating Judge 
Thomas because he was an African-American and very conser-
vative, instead of nominating many other African-American 
lawyers who possessed greater experience but had more moder-
ate political views.73 
The confirmation proceedings were extremely conten-
tious. 74 The administration and Republican senators chose to 
rely substantially on character issues, emphasizing Judge 
Thomas' ability to overcome a poverty-stricken background.75 
Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee questioned 
Judge Thomas' qualifications for service on the Supreme Court 
while probing the jurist's philosophy of judging and his views 
on constitutional and statutory interpretation. 76 Judge Thom-
as steadfastly refused to participate in meaningful dialogue re-
garding anything substantive, behavior which became absurd 
when the nominee claimed that he had never seriously consid-
ered Roe v. Wade.77 
72. See The Supreme Court; Excerpts from News Conference Announcing Court 
Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1991, at A14; see also Leslie H. Gelb, Untruths ... , 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1991, § 4, at 15. Judge Thomas had served on the District of 
Columbia Circuit Court for less than eighteen months when President Bush nomi-
nated him. See Neil A. Lewis, Panel Backs Appeals Court Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 23, 1990, at A16. 
73. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, October Tragedy, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1497 
(1992); Gelb, supra note 72; see also A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter to 
Justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
1005 (1992); supra note 26. 
74. See Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. on the Nomination of 
Judge Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Thomas Hearings]. See generally 
NOMINATION OF CLARENCE THOMAS TO BE AN AsSOCIATE JUsrICE OF THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COUIIT, S. EXEC. REP. No. 15, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Sym-
posium, supra note 71. 
75. See, e.g., Excerpts from Senate's Hearings on the Thomas Nomination, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1991, at A22 [hereinafter Thomas Hearings Excerpts] (opening 
statement of Clarence Thomas); see also Higginbotham, supra note 73, at 1026. See 
generally GITENsrEIN, supra note 1, at 323-46. 
76. See, e.g., Thomas Hearings Excerpts, supra note 75 (statements of Sen. 
Biden and Sen. Kennedy); The Thomas Hearings; Excerpts from Senate's Hearings 
on the Thomas Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1991, at A20 (statements of Sen. 
Leahy and Sen. Metzenbaum). 
77. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The process degenerated into a public spectacle in 
which Professor Anita Hill accused Judge Thomas of sexual harassment and he 
responded with allegations of a "hi-tech lynching." The senators, for their part, 
ineptly handled the matter. They asked vacuous and misleading questions under 
the glare of television lights as millions of viewers were simultaneously captivated 
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The Bush administration departed in other ways from 
President Reagan's approach to judicial selection. For instance, 
President Bush stated that he sought to appoint judges who 
would interpret the law, :not ''legislat[e] from the bench," there-
by modifying somewhat President Reagan's formulation. 78 
Moreover, the Bush administration centralized responsibility in 
the office of White House Counsel, C. Boyden Gray, which 
partially reduced Justic·e Department participation. 79 Presi-
dent Bush also undertook greater efforts to seek out and nomi-
nate highly qualified women and minorities, although his ad-
ministration only did so after two years in office and these 
endeavors were less thorough than President Carter's ef-
forts. 80 The Bush administration did not scrutinize judicial 
candidates' political philosophies as systematically as the Rea-
gan administration,. but it had little need to analyze closely 
those Reagan district court appointees who constituted a sub-
stantial percentage of President Bush's appellate court nomi-
nees. 81 
Another way that the Reagan and Bush administrations 
differed was their relationships with the ABA Standing Com-
mittee on Judiciary.82 During President Bush's tenure, rela-
tions with the committee deteriorated even more. Attorney 
General Richard Thombmgh requested that the ABA disavow 
consideration of nominees' ideological or political perspectives 
in evaluating them.83 The ABA responded that it only exam-
ined those views when they became relevant to nominees' qual-
ifications, such as integrity, competence, and judicial tempera-
and repelled by the bizarre public display. See also Chemerinsky, supra note 73, at 
1503; Gelb, supra note 72. See generally RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: 
ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL 
REALITY (Toni Morrison ed., 1992); Symposium, supra note 71. 
78. See, e.g., Bush v. Clinton: The Candidates on Legal Issues, A.B.A. J., Oct. 
1992, at 57 [hereinafter Bush v. Clinton]; The Candidates Respond, A.B.A. J., Oct. 
1988, at 52, 57; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
79. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 
JUDICATURE 282, 285, 296 (1993); Goldman, supra note 19, at 297; Miner, supra 
note 55, at 1080. 
80. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 19, at 297; Letter, supra note 67; see also 
supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text. 
81. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 36; Marcus, supra note 36; see also Goldman, 
supra note 19, at 294; supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. 
82. I rely substantially here on Goldman, supra note 19. See also supra notes 
51-53 and accompanying text. 
83. See Goldman, supra note 19, at 295. 
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ment.84 The Attorney General found the Association's explana-
tion inadequate, stating that it jeopardized committee involve-
ment in the nomination process. 85 The Attorney General and 
the committee eventually reached an agreement in which the 
ABA expressly disavowed any consideration of ideological or 
political perspectives in the rating process, and the committee 
reassumed responsibility for reviewing nominees' qualifica-
tions. 86 Nonetheless, Fresident Bush recently expressed lin-
gering concerns about the committee's objectivity,87 thus indi-
cating that the dispute was not satisfactorily resolved. 
The Bush administration ultimately realized the goal of 
making the federal courts more conservative, even though it 
lacked a clear popular mandate to do so, as the stormy proceed-
ings to confirm Justice Thomas .demonstrate.88 Certain evi-
dence suggests, however, that Bush appointees are somewhat 
less doctrinaire than those of President Reagan.89 An impor-
tant example is Justice Souter, whose moderate voting record 
on a number of constitutional issues has led writers to classify 
him as one member of a new centrist coalition which includes 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and Justice Anthony Kennedy.90 
President Bush's appointees were also more diverse in 
terms of gender and race. Women comprised 18.7% (36 out of 
192) of the judges whom he selected, while African-Americans 
constituted 5.2% (10 out of 192).91 The Bush administration 
also named the youngest judges in American history, which 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id.; cf. Charles E. Anderson, Thornburgh on the Record, A.B.A. J., Jan. 
1991, at 56 (attributing controversy to ABA!s adoption of resolution favoring abor-
tion rights); see also Marianne Lavelle, ... And Role of the ABA, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 
6, 1990, at 43. 
87. See Bush v. Clinton, supra note 78, at 58. 
88. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. 
89. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 19, at 295-98; Lewis, supra note 19. But 
see Bill Clinton, Judiciary Suffers Racial, Sexual Lack of Balance, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 
2, 1992, at 15. 
90. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803 (1992) (join-
ing Court's opinion with Justices O'Connor and Kennedy); Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2146 (1992) (concurring with Justice Kennedy); see also 
Scott P. Johnson & Christopher E. Smith, David Souter's First Term on the Su-
preme Court: The Impact of a New Justice, 75 JUDICATURE 238 (1992). See general-
ly Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 27-34 (1992). 
91. Telephone Interview with George Kassouf, Alliance for Justice, Washing-
ton, D.C. (Nov. 2, 1992). 
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means that its appointees will continue to have influence well 
into the twenty-first century. 92 
In sum, this examination of judicial selection under the 
administrations of Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Bush illus-
trates that the process has been problematic in numerous 
ways. The assessment also finds that the public has become 
increasingly disenchanted with the selection process. The next 
s13ction, accordingly, offers suggestions which draw substantial-
ly on the most efficacious techniques employed by previous 
administrations, Democratic and Republican. 93 
II. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A. Judicial Selection Goals 
1. Selecting judges based on merit 
Merit is the goal which should animate the new 
administration's policy of federal judicial selection. President 
Clinton must appoint only those attorneys who will be excellent 
judges. Nominees should be distinguished lawyers with superb 
qualifications. For instaince, the attorneys must have been 
involved in extremely rigorous legal activity, although the 
work's challenging character is more important than its precise 
form.94 Nominees should also be highly intelligent and very 
industrious while evidencing balanced dispositions. For exam-
ple, the lawyers must have the type of broad intellect, willing-
ness to labor vigorously, and appropriately measured judicial 
temperament that will enable them to discharge properly the 
federal courts' significant responsibilities, implicating such 
92. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 89; Lewis, supra note 19. 
93. The suggestions are meant to be rather idealistic but are tempered by 
certain pragmatic and political realities. For instance, the recommendations suggest 
the de-emphasis of senatorial patronage and courtesy while calling for senators to 
retain substantial responsibility in judicial selection. See infra notes 131-132 and 
accompanying text. This recognizes the potential for senatorial influence to under-
mine merit while acknowledging that senators can make helpful contributions, will 
resist ceding one of the last vestiges of pure patronage, and are essential to Presi-
dent Clinton's achievement of other goals, especially economic ones. The suggestions 
also assume that the traditional lower court confirmation process will change mini-
mally, given the 100 vacant seats; other priorities, such as the economy and for-
eign policy initiatives; and the level of interest and resources that senators will 
devote to selection. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
94. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, More Women Named Federal Judges, 43 FLA. L. 
REV. 477, 485 (1991); Tobias, supra note 1, at 181; see also infra note 123 and 
accompanying text. 
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issues as the death penalty and abortion. Nominees should 
possess additional qualities which are less easily described but 
that are essential to superior judicial service. These include 
impeccable integrity and substantial independence. In short, 
merit must be the touchstone of selection. 
It is important at this particular juncture that the admin-
istration name the finest judges. Some observers have declared 
that the federal judiciary is in crisis, beleaguered by such phe-
nomena as the litigation explosion, litigation abuse, increasing-
ly complicated civil lawsuits, and an expanding criminal docket 
primarily attributable to the war on drugs. 95 Although these 
propositions are controversial,96 there is widespread agree-
ment that the federal courts constitute a scarce public re-
source. 97 The Supreme Court and Congress have also enlarged 
district judges' discretion through procedural changes, such as 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and more 
deferential appellate review.98 The above considerations mean 
that President Clinton must appoint judges who can resolve 
cases efficiently, fairly, and correctly while exercising their 
significant discretion in ways which strike the appropriate 
balance between expeditious and just disposition. 
2. Creating balance 
Although the new administration probably ought to treat 
merit as paramount, it should also seriously consider other 
factors that could serve as goals. An important example is the 
enhancement of balance, in terms of gender, racial diversity, 
and political perspectives, on the federal courts. 
95. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 416, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 6-32 (1990), reprinted in 
1990 U.S.C.C.AN. 6803, 6808-35; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COUR'rS: CRI-
SIS AND REFORM (1985). See generally FEDERAL COUR'rS STuDY COMMI'ITEE, WORK-
ING PAPERS AND SUBCOMl\U'ITEE REPOR'rS (1990). 
96. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; or, the Feder-
al Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 921; Lauren K. Robel, The 
Politics of Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 115 (1991). 
See generally Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 288-89 (1989). 
97. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 95; Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for a System 
in Crisis: Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1, 2-9 (1990); Robel, supra note 96. 
98. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 16; Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 
384, 405 (1990). See generally Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837 (1984); 
Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil 
Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 933 (1991). 
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The administration can simultaneously attain these goals 
of merit and balance, primarily because they are compatible. 
For instance, the large, highly qualified pool of female and 
minority attorneys that presently exists makes it possible to 
increase merit, diversity~ and political balance on the federal 
bench.99 Balance, therefore, warrants additional exploration. 
a. Gender and racial diversity. The administration could 
consult the current composition of the federal judiciary, asking 
whether the courts should be differently constituted along the 
lines of gender, race, or political viewpoints. Enhanced gender 
and racial diversity are significant factors that candidate 
Clinton promised his administration would closely consid-
er.100 For example, President Clinton might enlarge the num-
bers of female and African-American judges. 
There are several important reasons why the country 
needs the diverse viewpoints which many women and minori-
ties bring to judicial service. For instance, most female judges 
can more easily appreciate specific difficulties, such as securing 
jobs, balancing employment and familial responsibilities, and 
encountering gender discrimination, that numerous women 
face. 101 Female and minority judges could also heighten the 
courts' sensitivity to the increasingly complex issues of public 
policy which must be resolved. These questions include alloca-
tion of scarce resources and affirmative action.102 Some evi-
dence correspondingly suggests that many citizens, such as 
poverty-stricken individuals, have greater confidence in a feder-
al judiciary which more closely approximates the gender and 
racial composition of American society.103 The appointment of 
additional women and minorities might also enhance political 
99. Nominees' meritorious qualifications and the quality of judicial service 
that appointees render are similar, but not identical, concepts. For instance, meri-
torious qualifications are not a guarantee of excellent service, but they are strong 
indicators. See supra notes 19-20, 25-27, 66 and accompanying text; infra notes 
112-117 and accompanying text. 
100. See Bush v. Clinton, supra note 78, at 57-58; Clinton, supra note 89. 
101. See, e.g., Marion Z. Goldberg, Carter-Appointed Judges: Perspectives on 
Gender, TRIAL, Apr. 1990, at 108; Elaine Martin, Men and Women on the Bench: 
Vit•e la Difference?, 73 JUDICATURE 204, 204 (1990). See generally Judith S. Kaye, 
Women Lawyers in Big Firms: A Study in Progress Toward Gender Equality, 57 
FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 122-26 (1988). 
102. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 16, at 494; Slotnick, supra note 2, at 272-
73. 
103. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, A Profile of Cart.er's Judicial Nominees, 62 
JUDICATURE 246, 253 (1978); cf. Bush v. Clinton, supra note 78, at 57-58 (similar 
suggestion by candidate Clinton); Clinton, supra note 89 (same). 
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balance, because they will have more moderate political per-
spectives than most Reagan and Bush appointees. 104 
b. Political balance. The administration, when consult-
ing the existing composition of the federal bench, could ask 
whether the judiciary should be differently comprised in terms 
of its political views. Greater political balance is an important 
factor which candidate Clinton intimated he would exam-
ine.105 His administration might consider how candidates as 
judges would resolve numerous substantive issues. For in-
stance, President Clinton could nominate attorneys who would 
provide broad citizen access to the courts; interpret enactments 
in a manner sympathetic to congressional intent, recognizing 
the difficulties of legislating with blinding clarity for every 
contingency; and expansively regard individual constitutional 
rights.106 
The interrelated propositions respecting court access and 
statutory interpretation are justifiable, because the administra-
tion and the Senate can properly attempt to insure that the 
nominees proposed, and the judges confirmed, will be solicitous 
of congressional intent expressed in the substantive legislation 
that Congress has passed and that the Executive Branch must 
enforce. 107 The idea as to constitutional rights is a rather con-
104. Several of these concepts may be overstated or crudely instrumental, as 
two prominent Republican appointees illustrate. Supreme Court Justice Clarence 
Thomas and Circuit Judge Edith Jones have been very conservative judges, evi-
dencing little empathy for individuals accused of crime or who pursue post-convic-
tion relief. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1004 (1992) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (evincing little sympathy in Eighth Amendment case for inmate who 
was badly beaten); Tobias, supra note 1, at 179-80 (discussing display by Judge 
Jones of problematic judicial temperament in death row appeals). 
105. See Bush v. Clinton, supra note 78, at 57-58; Clinton, supra note 89. 
106. I am not advocating that he do so, because this activity could be charac-
terized as using litmus tests that liberals accused President Reagan of employing 
and because it is no more appropriate for Democrats than Republicans to treat 
judicial appointments as a means of courting political constituencies. See supra 
notes 36, 43-44, 68 and accompanying text; infra note 120. Candidate Clinton 
promised to appoint only judges "who believe in ... the right to choose" abortion. 
See Joan Biskupic, Court Vacancies Await President, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1992, at 
Al. Use of litmus tests is inadvisable, and President Clinton should clearly state 
that his administration will not employ them. 
107. For example, Senator Grassley has attempted to protect senatorial prerog-
atives by questioning recent Supreme Court nominees on their views of statutory 
interpretation. See, e.g., Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia: Hearings Before the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 63-69 (1986) (discussion be-
tween Sen. Grassley and Judge Scalia); Thomas Hearings, supra note 74, at 65-68, 
177-502 (statements of Sen. Grassley and Judge Thomas); see also Carl Tobias, 
Examining Thomas' Ideas on Statutory Analysis, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 9, 1991, at 
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t:roversial, but extremely legitimate, view of the courts' role, 
which finds substantial support in much jurisprudence of the 
Vv arren Court. 108 
B. Additional Justifications for the Goals of Merit and 
Balance: The Republican Administrations' Record 
Additional propositions support treating merit and balance 
as important goals. Most significant is the record of judicial 
selection that the Republican administrations compiled over a 
twelve-year time frame in which they appointed two-thirds of 
the present federal bench.109 During this period, the Republi-
can chief executives exceeded popular consensus in nominating 
conservative Supreme Court candidates. President Reagan 
chose most, and President Bush selected many, of the circuit 
and district court judges principally because the appointees had 
conservative political and philosophical perspectives and would 
placate conservative elements in the Republican Party. Of the 
judges named, African-Americans constituted less than two 
percent of President Reagan's appointees, and only five percent 
of President Bush's.110 The substantive decisionmaking of 
these Republican appointees has been conservative; the judges 
have narrowly interpreted individuals' constitutional rights and 
congressional statutes while limiting federal court access. 111 
Although President Reagan clearly, and President Bush 
apparently, elevated conservative political factors over merit, 
ascertaining whether their appointments actually eroded the 
bench's quality is problematic.112 It is fair to surmise, howev-
33. See generally Carl Tobias, faterspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. 
REV. 359, 402-05 (1989) (tracing historical development of view that courts should 
be solicitous of congressional intent); Robert F. Williams, Statutes As Sources of 
Law Beyond Their Terms in Common-Law Cases, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 554, 558 
(1982) (same). 
108. See Cox, supra note 32. But see Bomc, supra note 32; cf. RONALD 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGIITS SERIOUSLY (1977) (eloquent theoretical rendition of argu-
ment). 
109. See supra notes 29-92 and accompanying text. 
110. See supra notes 60, 91 and accompanying text. The Bush administration 
named a higher percentage of women than President Carter, although it had a 
substantially larger, more qualified, pool. See supra notes 62, 91 and accompanying 
te:ct. One explanation for the dearth of African-American appointees may be that 
the Republican Presidents could find no more African-Americans whom they consid-
ered sufficiently conservative. See Dan Trigoboff, Bush Judicial Nominees Blasted, 
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1991, at 20; see also supra note 73; cf. Bush v. Clinton, supra note 
78, at 57-58. 
111. See supra notes 63-66, 88-90 and accompanying text. 
112. The debate over quality here resembles that above. See supra notes 19-28 
1257] FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION 1279 
er, that the chief executives' nearly single-minded pursuit of 
conservative ideology sacrificed other important attributes, 
including competence, and could have diluted the courts' quali-
ty. Even conservative commentators have criticized Presidents 
Reagan and Bush for naming mediocre Supreme Court Justic-
es. 113 
The controversy over Daniel Manion's fitness to serve on 
the Seventh Circuit additionally supports these ideas.114 Dur-
ing the 1980s, Democratic senators became increasingly frus-
trated with President Reagan's nominations of attorneys whose 
candidacies seemed to be premised more on political consider-
ations than on ability.115 The Democrats forced that issue 
when the President nominated Manion. They argued that the 
lawyer's mediocre record as a practicing attorney meant that he 
was chosen principally for his sterling conservative creden-
tials. 116 After a bitter nomination fight, the Senate confirmed 
Manion by the narrowest possible margin; Vice-President Bush 
voted to break a tie.117 The Democrats, however, clearly indi-
cated that they would consider as unacceptable future nomina-
tions which were primarily motivated by ideological factors. 
C. Resolution 
In short, the Clinton administration could treat merit and 
balance as significant goals. Several propositions above show 
that diversity and political balance have important intrinsic 
value. For example, the public has greater respect for, and 
and accompanying text. 
113. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, A Court of Mediocrity, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1991, at 74; 
see also O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 62 (statement of Professor Philip Kurland); 
Thomas: The Least Qualified Nominee So Far?, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 16, 1991, at 5; cf. 
Tom Wicker, A Court of Mediocrity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1991, at A17 (liberal ob-
server). 
114. I rely substantially here on conversations with Mark Gitenstein [hereinaf-
ter Conversations], who was minority counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee at 
the time, and Philip Shenon, Senate Ending Judicial Fight, Giues Manion Final 
Approval, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1986, at Al. See also NOMINATION OF DANIEL A. 
MANION, S. EXEC. REP. No. 16, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter MANION 
REPORT]. See generally Larry W. Yackle, Choosing Judges the Democratic Way, 69 
B.U. L. REV. 273, 305-16 (1989). 
115. See Shenon, supra note 114 (discussing Manion's limited federal court 
experience); Gitenstein conversations, supra note 114. 
116. See Shenon, supra note 114 (Manion's father was founder of the John 
Birch Society); see also MANION REPORT, supra note 114; Tobias, supra note 1, at 
183. 
117. See Shenon, supra note 114. 
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confidence in, a federal judiciary whose constitution closely 
reflects society's gender and racial composition and political 
views.118 Therefore, the dearth of African-American judges 
named by the Republican Presidents might lead President 
Clinton to place numerous African-Americans on the bench, 
even if other attorneys have superior qualifications. 119 The 
Republicans' practically wholehearted pursuit of conservatism 
in selecting federal judges could similarly support Democratic 
attempts to name equally liberal appointees.120 Although the 
new administration may be tempted to follow, and could justify, 
this approach, its adoption would be inadvisable, principally 
because President Clinton can simultaneously achieve merit 
and balance. 121 
An important reason for this compatibility is that a sub-
stantial, extremely well-qualified pool of female and minority 
lawyers now exists. A number of these attorneys have been 
actively involved in very rigorous types of legal activity, some 
of which may be less traditional than practice in large law 
firms, that effectively requires many attorneys to become ad-
ministrators.122 Certain forms of lawyering, such as conduct-
ing high-impact voting rights litigation for the NAACP, or envi-
ronmental litigation for the Sierra Club, working in the offices 
of federal public defenders or United States attorneys, or writ-
ing trenchant scholarship on the federal courts, could better 
equip lawyers to be excellent judges.123 
118. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
119. I obviously use the last clause for rhetorical purposes. See also supra note 
12 and accompanying text. 
120. Indeed, the judicial appointments policy pursued, and the judges named, 
over three terms by Presidents Reagan and Bush might enable the new adminis-
tration to support such clearly partisan premises for appointment as liberalism and 
the cultivation of the Democratic Party's liberal wing, although it ordinarily would 
be no more appropriate for Democrats than for Republicans to appoint judges pri-
marily on these bases. 
121. See supra note 99. 
122. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
123. Working in a United States Attorney's Office might be preferable experi-
ence for service on the district bench; writing trenchant scholarship may be prefer-
able for appellate courts. See also supra note 94 and accompanying text. This sub-
stantial, well-qualified pool also obviates other difficulties. It enables the adminis-
tration to minimize the controv·~rsy that surrounds affirmative action and quotas. 
See supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLEC-
TIONS OF AN AFFffiMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991). The pool also permits the adminis-
tration to avoid appearing vindictive; the trite formulation is that two wrongs do 
not make a right. See Stephen L. Carter, No Krwwn Cure for the Abuse of Power, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1992, § 4, at 17. 
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The quality and magnitude of this pool mean that Presi-
dent Clinton need not sacrifice merit for balance. The 
administration's effort to name the very best judges may corre-
spondingly warrant some, albeit minimal, compromise in terms 
of diversity or political perspectives. For example, the nation 
and the courts should not lose the talents of the next Lewis 
Powell, Harry Blackmun, or Henry Friendly because such an 
appointee would fail to enhance diversity or political bal-
ance.124 
The stress on merit in choosing judges should lead to con-
comitant de-emphasis of political considerations, although they 
probably cannot be eliminated.125 Indeed, many aspects of ju-
dicial selection are principally political. Attempts to extricate 
the process from politics, therefore, may be naive or prove fu-
tile. The preferable approach is to recognize and allow for the 
political nature of the process, maximizing the beneficial and 
minimizing the detrimental effects of politics, and being realis-
tic about the role that politics plays.126 
III. PROCEDURES FOR ACHIEVING GoALS 
The new administration can attain merit and balance in 
numerous ways. President Clinton and his advisers responsible 
for recruiting judges should first clearly articulate the 
administration's philosophy of, and procedures for, judicial 
selection. The President ought to provide this guidance in an 
executive order, because formal promulgation would afford 
notice, clarity, and regularity, which will be important to secur-
ing compliance, fostering cooperation of participants involved in 
selection, and increasing public confidence in the process.127 
A. Administration Personnel Responsible for 
Judicial Selection · 
The capabilities of the administration officials who recruit 
judges will be as significant as the specific procedures ultimate-
124. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 564-65 (1989) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (Justice Stevens' tribute to Judge Friendly); Sandra Day O'Connor, A 
Tribute to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARV. L. REV. 395 (1987). 
125. I am indebted to Mark Gitenstein for most of the ideas in this paragraph. 
See also Stephen L. Carter, Let's Fess Up to What's Been Going On, LEGAL TIMES, 
Nov. 9, 1992, at 27. See generally GITENSTEIN, supra note 1. 
126. See supra note 93 and accompanying text; infra note 132. 
127. See supra notes 8, 10, 37-38 and accompanying text. 
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ly employed. 128 For instance, those officers' competence will 
have greater importance than whether the White House or the 
Department of Justice assumes primary responsibility in select-
ing judges.129 They must exercise good judgment and know 
how to recognize merit and distinguish it from political factors. 
The persons should be conciliators who can work effectively 
with all participants in the selection process. The officials must 
also be willing to invoke the requisite authority to protect zeal-
ously the process' integrity by countering any activity which 
jeopardizes it. These threats could emanate from a plethora of 
sectors, such as other administration personnel who may wish 
to apply litmus tests, special interest groups that might seek to 
veto nominees, or senators who may favor the nomination of 
their political supporters. Moreover, the officials should have 
the complete confidence of the President. If the officers possess 
these attributes, they can recruit highly qualified judges. 130 
B. Suggested Procedures for Assembling Candidates 
The individuals responsible for selection must diligently 
seek out, find, and advocate candidates of the finest caliber. 
Each time President Clinton prepares to fill a judgeship, ad-
ministration officials must assemble the best pool of potential 
candidates, drawn from a broad spectrum of lawyers. The offi-
cers ought to enlist the assistance of rather traditional sources, 
such as state and local bar associations. 
Throughout the process, the officials must work closely 
with senators who represent the geographic areas in which 
judges are to sit, because senatorial help and cooperation will 
facilitate selection. The senators will undoubtedly be active 
128. This is especially true in light of other suggestions and certain assump-
tions made here. For example, given the roles envisioned for senators and the 
assumption that lower court confirmation proceedings will continue to lack sub-
stance, the abilities of administration officials will have compelling significance. See 
supra note 93 and accompanying text; infra note 132. 
129. See GITENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 69-73, 82-87, 205-06 (describing problem-
atic relationships between White House and Justice Department in Bork proceed-
ings); see also supra notes 42, 4~' -50 and accompanying text. 
130. The procedures attempt to strike appropriate balances among numerous 
considerations relevant to judicial selection. An important example is how open the 
process should be. It is difficult to quarrel with a process that maximizes openness, 
which might mean that many individuals should search for candidates. Nonethe-
less, more participants could be less effective because, for instance, they could 
politicize the process earlier and eliminate excellent candidates. In short, efficacious 
selection warrants some compromise in terms of openness. 
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participants, although the precise form of their involvement, 
which could range from suggesting candidates to vetoing attor-
neys whom the administration proposes, will depend on numer-
ous variables that arise in specific situations.131 The variables 
might include whether vacancies are in circuit courts which 
typically encompass multi-state regions, or district courts with-
in one state; the particular senator's party affiliation; familiari-
ty with individual candidates; and relationships with the ad-
ministration, the other senators who represent the relevant 
regions, and members of the Senate Judiciary Committee.132 
Administration officials should confer with additional 
sources when gathering the names of possible candidates. They 
ought to contact persons and groups that can suggest highly 
qualified lawyers whom traditional sources may not Im.ow be-
cause the attorneys engage in less traditional forms of legal en-
deavors. 133 Examples are individuals or representatives of or-
ganizations, such as women's groups, who served on the nomi-
nating commissions that proved so effective in recruiting fe-
male and minority candidates during the Carter administra-
tion.134 
131. Cf. Carl Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public Rights Exception to Party Joinder, 
65 N.C. L. REV. 745, 770 (1987) (treating situations comprised of multiple vari-
ables); Carl Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public Participation: Resolving the Issue 
of Agency Authority to Reimburse Public Participants in Administrative Proceedings, 
82 COLUM. L. REV. 906, 955 (1982) (same). 
132. The procedures seek to maximize the best and minimize the least desir-
able aspects of the roles which senators, patronage and senatorial courtesy play in 
judicial selection. For instance, the procedures recognize that senators who repre-
sent areas in which judgeships must be filled will know many attorneys who would 
be excellent judges and call for the senators' active participation; they concomitant-
ly acknowledge that senators might not know highly qualified candidates who have 
engaged in less traditional legal work and propose measures to treat this problem. 
The procedures also de-emphasize patronage and senatorial courtesy, because they 
could undermine merit even while recognizing that senators' cooperation will be 
critical to selection. Senators' loss of benefits from reduced reliance on patronage 
and senatorial courtesy may be offset, however, by the public perception that very 
meritorious judges have been appointed, the administration's devotion of its re-
sources to the effort, and the deflection from senators of adverse publicity that 
might attend controversial candidates' nomination. See also Fowler, supra note 1, 
at 310-25 (fmding Carter and Reagan administrations more successful in altering 
traditional procedures for circuit court nominees). 
133. See supra notes 94, 123 and accompanying text. 
134. The procedures do not contemplate revitalization of the judicial nominat-
ing commissions because the procedures provide many of the panels' benefits with 
fewer detriments. The commissions were an effective means of fostering the ap-
pointment of highly qualified female and minority judges. Nonetheless, the large 
number of participants involved and the more open procedures used may have 
impaired the panels' efficacy. Moreover, commission decisions involving membership 
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C. Suggestions for Recommending Finalists 
1. Narrowing the pool 
Once the officers have collected a large pool of potential 
candidates, the officials should designate a small number of the 
ablest attorneys by employing the indicia of merit enumerated 
above.135 Narrowing the field to relatively few candidates, 
ideally less than five, will make the process manageable yet af-
ford sufficient flexibility to meet unanticipated contingencies, 
such as last-minute political opposition. The officers probably 
should conduct confidential interviews with individuals who 
know these lawyers professionally and personally. 136 The ses-
sions would illuminate and refine the merit determination; 
afford instructive insigh1ts on candidates' philosophical perspec-
tives, if political balance becomes relevant; and avoid potential-
ly embarrassing revelations. Close communications with sena-
tors who represent the area will be critical at this juncture. 
2. Consultation 
The new administration should informally consult with the 
Senate before officially submitting the names of nominees. 137 
The administration may want to propose multiple candidates 
for each judicial seat and seek the Senate Judiciary 
Committee's views of those whom it finds preferable. Consulta-
tion honors the Constitution's phrasing, which states that the 
President appoints with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate.138 Consultation should correspondingly enhance the 
administration's ability to secure consent, as senators will have 
and the candidates forwarded W•?re very political. Revival of the commissions, espe-
cially in the district courts, would also be time consuming-a difficulty that is com-
pounded in districts that have unfilled judgeships and are currently experiencing 
backlogs. Liberals and conservatives agree on certain of these ideas. See, e.g., 
Goldman, supra note 17, at 319-20; Telephone Interview with George Kassouf, 
Judicial Selection Project, Alliance for Justice, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 17, 1992) 
(similar idea as to Clinton administration). If the new administration deems revi-
talization appropriate, it should experiment with re-instituting the circuit panels, as 
there would need to be fewer of them and fewer judicial vacancies to fill. 
135. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. 
136. They must be sensitive to privacy concerns. Cf. supra note 77 (public 
spectacle in Thomas hearings). 
137. See GITENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 333-46; Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 
1, at 1518. But see William B. iReynolds, The Confirmation Process: Too Much Ad-
vice and Too Little Consent, 75 JUDICATURE 80 (1991). 
138. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. See generally Mathias, supra note 1; Miner, su-
pra note 55. 
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actively participated in considering candidates. Moreover, con-
sultation is rather easy to accomplish and would minimize the 
possibility that nominees will prove controversial.139 
The administration should concomitantly maintain open 
communications with Republican senators, even if it does not 
formally consult. This could facilitate confirmation and might 
repair relations that were frayed during the confirmation of 
Justice Clarence Thomas.140 It may help resolve questions re-
garding the scope of legitimate inquiry in probing nominees, 
such as whether senators can insist that nominees answer 
queries about their political or judicial philosophies.141 Demo-
cratic senators should extend courtesies to Senate Republicans 
like those that the Grand Old Party afforded Democrats be-
tween 1980 and 1986 when Republicans controlled the White 
House and Senate.142 
3. ABA participation 
The administration and the Senate must seek the valuable 
assistance of the ABA Standing Committee on Judiciary as the 
process nears completion. That entity should continue to dis-
charge the responsibility for advising the Senate on candidates' 
qualifications which it has performed so capably for nearly a 
half-century.143 Some observers have criticized the committee 
for relying too substantially on certain types of practice experi-
ence, and for being overly political when evaluating nomi-
nees. 144 The committee should be responsive to · these con-
cerns, although its input has essentially been helpful. 
139. The Clinton administration, therefore, should consult, although it has less 
need to do so than when different political parties control the Executive Branch 
and the Senate. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. The cordial rela-
tions which Senator Joseph Biden, the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
enjoys with Senator Orrin Hatch, the ranking minority member, means that com-
mittee processing of nominees should proceed rather smoothly. 
140. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. 
141. This has been a particularly controversial issue. See also Chemerinsky, 
supra note 73, at 1503-06; supra notes 56-58, 71-77 and accompanying text. Com-
pare Bruce Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. L. REV. 
672, 687 (1989) with Albert P. Melone, The Senate's Confirmation Role in Supreme 
Court Nominations and the Politics of Ideology Versus Impartiality, 75 JUDICATURE 
68 (1991). 
142. See supra notes 54-55, 139 and accompanying text. 
143. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
144. See, e.g., Laurence H. Silberman, The American Bar Association and Judi-
cial Nominations, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1092 (1992); The Candidates Respond, 
supra note 78, at 56; supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The inauguration of President Clinton, who will appoint at 
least three hundred Article III judges during the next four 
years, offers a valuable opportunity to reexamine the process of 
federal judicial selection. The Clinton administration should 
follow the suggestions afforded above in choosing these judges. 
If President Clinton implements this guidance, he will be able 
to appoint excellent judges and enhance public confidence in 
the process. 145 
145. When this Article was in press, the Clinton administration concluded its 
first year of judicial selection. During that year, President Clinton nominated forty-
eight individuals for positions on the federal bench; of those forty-eight, eighteen 
were women (37.5%) and thirteen were minorities (27.2%). Twenty-eight of the 
nominees have been confirmed; of those twenty-eight, eleven are women (39.3%) 
and seven are minorities (25%). Telephone Interview with George Kassouf, Alliance 
for Justice, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 4, 1994). 
